قراءة في آفاق عمل تحالف تحرير الصومال

A Reading of the Prospects for the Alliance for the Liberation of Somalia¹

Image: A street in Asmara, capital of Eritrea — Clay Gilliland from Chandler, U.S.A., Wikimedia Commons (CC BY-SA 2.0) — Image page

International refusal to deal with it will strengthen the extremist elements

This article was first published in the newspaper Al-Quds Al-Arabi on 24 October 2007. Link to the original text

Ever since the Ethiopian occupation came to lie heavy on Somalia and drove out the Islamic Courts², consultative conferences have been held without pause in many places of the diaspora, where ideas were exchanged and proposals put forward. The prevailing view was that a political body was needed to unite the forces opposed to the occupation and to lead the political and military struggle against it. The writer of these lines was perhaps the first to set out that idea in writing, in his article “The Islamic Courts: The Causes of the Fall and the Foundations of a Revival”, published on Al Jazeera Net a month after Ethiopian forces entered the Somali capital. He later developed it in a number of papers presented at conferences he attended in European and Arab capitals during this year. Over time, as many people discussed it, the idea grew more mature, clearer and more widely accepted. In between the general conferences, each of the four components³ held meetings of its own to set out its direction and its options. Among them was a meeting held by the Courts in early June to assess their experience and lay down their plan for the future. It was followed by the Doha conference of 6–8 June 2007, attended by leaders of the Courts and of the parliament alongside members of the diaspora and civil society. There we presented a detailed paper on the idea, entitled “The Road to Saving Somalia”. The project was discussed, and it was agreed to form a preparatory committee for a conference at which this alliance would be formed and announced at the earliest opportunity. A committee drawn from the four components was set up and spent two months drafting the alliance's political programme and charter. After that came the Conference for the Liberation and Reconstitution of Somalia in Asmara⁴. Its sessions received good media coverage, especially from the Somali channel Universal TV, which broadcasts from London, and its debates and contributions were followed by Somalis at home and abroad and by Somali websites. The conference ran for nine consecutive days, in which the parties held serious, at times even heated, debate that bore fruit in agreement on a political programme and a national charter. On 14 September 2007 the conference closed with the announcement of the Alliance for the Liberation of Somalia from the Ethiopian Occupation, which brings together all the forces opposed to the occupation, chief among them the Islamic Courts Union, the free parliament, the Somali diaspora, civil society and a number of eminent figures. This development did not come out of nowhere. It came as part of the natural evolution of the efforts made by the forces opposed to the occupation, and it carried particular meanings within the historical and present context of the Somali crisis. That is why the positions of local, regional and international parties were clear from the first day of the conference, and why it created opportunities and challenges for the new alliance.

What the Formation of This Alliance Signifies, and Its Effects

Many Somalis see this alliance as a development in Somali political thought that will shape the vision and the method with which Somalis address their problems in the near and distant future. It will be a pivot for future solutions to the Somali crisis. Among the most important things it signifies:

• It is the first political grouping of its kind since the civil war to bring national and Islamic forces together on a non-clan basis, moving beyond the principle, entrenched at every Somali peace conference, of sharing power on an illusory clan basis⁵. It is also the first political body to unite every section of Somali society on the principle of independence from the Ethiopian presence, on the model of the Somali Youth League, founded in 1943 to confront European colonialism, which led the country to independence from it in 1960⁶. The alliance has thus given the Somali people a surge of hope that the forces opposed to the occupation can unite, even on a basic measure of consensus.
• The many Islamic currents, Salafism in both its hardline and its moderate forms, the Muslim Brotherhood school, the Tablighi movement and others⁷, have united within a single national framework. They then entered into ideological debate with intellectual currents and political tendencies different from their own, and dissolved their differences in the face of the occupation. This marks a qualitative advance, even by Arab standards, on which it is possible to build, so that it may later produce political coexistence and mutual acceptance, leading to political pluralism and the peaceful rotation of power, with no one branded an unbeliever and no one shut out.
• Because the participants paid their own travel costs and part of their accommodation during the conference, their decisions and political positions were independent, springing from their sense of responsibility towards their country and dictated by no one. This was unlike the earlier political reconciliation conferences, where the spoils were divided to serve the strategies of particular parties and consciences were bought openly.
• It strengthens and enhances the role, in shaping Somalia's future political vision, of important elements that were marginalised or excluded at earlier conferences dominated by the warlords, above all the Islamic current.
• It brings to the fore the role of the Somali diaspora in Somalia's political decisions in the future. The diaspora's participation in the conference was intensive in both numbers and quality, and it took part as a body independent of the others, unlike previous conferences, where members of the diaspora took part as followers of warlords or as representatives of their clans. At this conference, by contrast, those who took part and joined the alliance were intellectuals who carry their country's cares and want to help shape its future policy on new foundations drawn from the experience they have gained living in the lands of the West.
• What the new alliance can add to the Somali political scene, now and in the future, becomes clear when we consider the sum of what the four allied forces represent: the military presence on the ground and the popular acceptance of the Islamic Courts; the political legitimacy represented by the free parliamentarians; the financial strength, expertise and administrative and political competence that the diaspora brings, together with its ability to influence the countries where it lives; the daily engagement with society that the forces of civil society embody through the services they provide and their links with international associations and organisations; and, in addition, the political weight carried by well-known political figures of acknowledged patriotism.

The alliance's effects on the Somali situation appeared quickly, even before its members had left Asmara. Militarily, the resistance's blows against the occupation forces and their collaborators grew fiercer, reaching the government's official seat in Baidoa after robbing it of sleep in Mogadishu. The structure of the so-called Transitional Federal Government, which arrived on the back of Ethiopian tanks and American missiles, began to crumble, and its backers in Washington and Addis Ababa were left confounded. A deep rift opened between the two poles of this client government⁸; the name-calling and estrangement between them grew sharper, and attempts to patch up their quarrel have so far failed. Sessions of parliament were delayed, and ministers and members of parliament lined up behind the two men along lines of clan and self-interest, something that had not happened since the occupation entered Somalia. This forced Ethiopia to summon both men to Addis Ababa to see about mending a tear that had grown too wide for the one patching it⁹. Following this, Arab and Western discourse about the Somali resistance changed: instead of accusing it of terrorism, it began to show signs of understanding for the forces opposed to the occupation, however timidly. This points to the role the alliance may play in Somalia's political future. One sign of it was the latest round of annual consultations between Egypt and Italy, held recently in Rome, which dealt with the situation in Somalia, in particular the latest developments and the moderate tendencies reflected at the Asmara meeting; the two sides stressed the need to coordinate with all the Somali parties concerned.

Declared Positions on the Alliance

Aware of the meanings set out above, and knowing the role the new alliance could play, local, regional and international parties formed their positions on it even before it was announced. Locally, Somalis followed the conference with striking attention on Somali websites, as the number of analytical articles written about it, and the political debate around it while the conference was in session, bear witness; most of it was positive. The Somali resistance's blows against the Ethiopian forces also grew fiercer during that period, as its morale rose. On the whole, the Somali people at home and abroad received it very positively.

The Federal Government, and behind it the Ethiopian government, pre-empted events by denouncing Eritrea and the conference, describing it as terrorist. The position of the United States seemed no different. Jendayi Frazer, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, harshly criticised the participants in Asmara and called them terrorists. While attending the meeting of the International Contact Group on Somalia in Rome on 10 September, she accused the Eritrean government of aggravating the violence in Somalia through its support for the insurgents, and called on the international community to cut off financial support to Eritrea until it stopped supporting them.

As for the European states, they seem to be swayed by the American position. Though unhappy with what is happening in Somalia, they still declare their support for the legitimate government, even while conceding that it can do nothing. To escape the embarrassment, they concentrate on replacing the Ethiopian forces with international ones under the umbrella of the United Nations, as emerged at the latest meeting in Rome; but so far this remains mere talk. The Arab states remained silent onlookers, except for the Saudi initiative, which came to crown the conference held in Mogadishu and to present it as a national reconciliation conference, even though it had excluded the most important element in the conflict¹⁰. Many Somalis saw the Saudi step as prompted by America, to lend some legitimacy and momentum to the Mogadishu conference, which many international observers had declared a failure. The positive side of the conference, however, lies in the fact that factions of the Federal Government called for the first time for the Ethiopian forces to be replaced with Arab and Islamic ones, perhaps to pull the rug from under the argument of the allies in Asmara, or perhaps as a reflection of the struggle among the wings and heads of the Federal Government, which came into the open as soon as they returned from Saudi Arabia.

But the deteriorating situation in Somalia, the split between the two poles of the transitional government and the inability of the Ethiopian forces to settle matters will lead many states to see things through a different lens, and their position on the alliance will soon change, as we have seen in the Egyptian and Italian position mentioned above.

Opportunities and Challenges

In the light of the capabilities of the forces that make up the new alliance, some of which we have mentioned above, one can see the opportunities it holds, and its future success depends on how well it puts them to use. The most important of these opportunities are:

• The ability of the diaspora to exert political influence on the countries where they live, using lawful means to press decision-makers.
• The ability of its educated elite to influence the Western think tanks that feed decision-makers, by taking an active part in meetings and seminars and presenting serious studies that explain the Somali question in greater depth and help it to be understood, countering the stereotyped interpretation promoted by Ethiopia, which presents it as a conflict among nomadic, pastoral clans.
• The ability of its members to make use of popular support, to present it well, and to show that the new alliance is not the Islamic Courts, whose hardline Islamist orientation the West feared.
• The alliance has media, political, diplomatic and administrative talent that enables it to fill many of the gaps that were noticeable earlier in the Islamic Courts.
• Its balance between the military and the diplomatic, rather than a focus on, or total reliance on, the military side alone.
• The Somali people are more aware, though not yet as aware as they need to be, and better understand the games of the Ethiopian occupation, which makes it easy for the alliance to find a popular base in many Somali regions.
• The support of the Somali media, an opportunity that can be used to mobilise the people and rouse them against the Ethiopian presence and those who deal with it. As for the challenges, they can be divided by source into those arising from within the alliance and those arising from circumstances outside it, by type into social, economic and political, and by the environment in which they operate into Somali and foreign.

But since the space allowed here does not permit such division and classification, we summarise the most prominent challenges below:

• The disease of clannism, which has afflicted the Somali people and made them watch every move through a clan lens.
• The Somali character, whatever its position, leader or led, save those on whom your Lord has mercy¹¹, lacks the necessary measure of patriotic feeling, political maturity, integrity and capacity to absorb change. Raising that level will demand great effort from the alliance, not only among the people but also among its own members, even though most of them are presumed to be sincere in their devotion to the cause.
• How to balance and reconcile the hardline and the diplomatic discourses, and the reliance on armed action and on politics, seems bound to be the subject of a constant tug-of-war among the alliance's parties.
• Protecting the alliance from whatever might lead to a sharp divergence that would threaten its survival and end in an irrevocable divorce between its parties¹², and working towards a constant search for consensus and understanding, in the hope of fully merging its forces and moving from the stage of an alliance to that of a unified organisation. This will certainly require concessions from all sides.
• The greatest external challenge lies in persuading the international community that the alliance is far removed from the charge of terrorism with which it has been branded by the United States, Ethiopia's backer; and, beyond that, persuading it that the alliance is the legitimate alternative to the Federal Government and the representative of the interests of the Somali people.
• Planning a way out of the bottleneck of the alliance's being based in Eritrea, and seeking to open up to the world and keep in constant contact with it. Eritrea, for all its unlimited support, remains limited in its means and isolated from the world because of its problems with the West, and it is impossible to reach the outside world through it.
• How to persuade Arab and Islamic states, especially those with regional weight, to adopt the alliance's vision and let it open offices on their soil, so as to open the world's horizons to it.
• Persuading the world that it is possible to hold the stick by the middle¹³, relying on both military and political resistance, may be difficult in a world order that insists on classifying armed resistance movements as terrorism.

Be that as it may, the emergence of this new alliance will bring a major development in Somalia's future, and whether states open the way to cooperation with it or shut their doors to it will play a large part in resolving or aggravating the complex Somali situation. For, in our view, refusing to deal with it will strengthen the hardline and extremist forces in Somalia and in the Horn of Africa generally, and so make its problems worse, while dealing with it and opening a window of hope before it will soften entrenched positions and bring forward the moderates, who will be the leaders of the political action to come. The international community must choose.

English translation prepared by artificial intelligence and reviewed against the Arabic for accuracy of meaning and rhetoric.