الطريق لإنقاذ الصومال

The Road to Saving Somalia: A Diagnosis of the Present and an Outline of a Project for the Future

Image: Destroyed buildings on the Mogadishu seafront, July 2007. ctsnow, Wikimedia Commons (CC BY 2.0). Image page

This paper was presented at the symposium “Foreign Interventions and the Future of the Horn of Africa”, held in Doha, Qatar, on 7 and 8 June 2007 under the auspices of the Arab Centre for Studies and Research and the Global Campaign to Resist Aggression. It was written in London on 29 May 2007.

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Abstract

This paper seeks to forge a solution to the Somali problem, which has grown steadily worse since the Ethiopian occupation of Somalia¹. It lays out an integrated plan for confronting the occupation through the efforts of Somalia's own sons, with the help and support of their brothers. Before that, it surveys the present situation and the Somalis' positions on it, and then the active players on the scene and their differing positions, in an effort to explore that situation and come to grips with it: to know the ground and the reality on which events are moving, so that, once understood, they can be dealt with.

It then reviews the solutions being discussed among some of the Somali elites as ways out of the crisis. Finally, it forges a solution that it claims is integrated, by setting out a long-term strategy that widens the horizon of hope and the field of action, with the aim of driving out the occupier and rebuilding Somalia on foundations of unity, at once patriotic and nationalist.

Introduction

There is no doubt that the Somali crisis, which has now passed the age of majority², needs a solution. But the solution must not be a truncated, piecemeal one. Such solutions are like treating from the outside an abscess that is festering within: unless the doctor takes his scalpel to the abscess and cleans out the pus and matter, the ointment he spreads on the surface will do no good. Nor must the solution be so difficult that it cannot be applied or achieved; and if it will take a long time, it should be applied in stages until the desired goal is reached. In a case like Somalia's, the knots that have piled up must be undone one knot at a time, until the rope runs straight and can be grasped. To forge such a solution, the problem must first be diagnosed; then the possible solutions must be reviewed, and their drawbacks and merits, obstacles and opportunities weighed against one another, so as to choose the least harmful and the most practicable.

Diagnosing the Present Situation

A diagnosis must arrive at a close description of the problem, point to the factors that aggravate it, and identify the parties to it and the role of each, so that the best way of dealing with it can be found.

Differing Views

Somalis see the Somali problem in its present state in many different ways, according to how close to it or how far from it each stands, and whether his attachment to one party or another is a matter of interest or of principle. If we want to diagnose the problem, we must acquaint ourselves with all these points of view and take them into account when we set about framing a solution.

The First Camp

This camp holds that the present situation cannot in any sense be called an occupation. It is, rather, a sovereign government seeking the help of another government to restore security and confront armed groups it cannot confront on its own. Accordingly, the way out of the crisis is to cooperate with this transitional government³ and help it restore security. This camp, too, is divided into two groups:

• One group does not hesitate to accept that Somalia is in the position of an occupied country. But it considers armed struggle against the occupier futile, given the occupier's superiority in equipment and numbers and the international collusion with it. The best way to end the occupation, therefore, is to strengthen the institution of government and work with it until its mandate, of which two years remain, runs out. After that, by strengthening the role of civil society and founding political parties, even with the occupier still present, the figures on whom the occupation relies can be removed from the stage, and the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces can then be demanded through the institutions.
• The second group holds that the Ethiopian presence is not an occupation at all: it came at the invitation of the legitimate government, to protect it and to fight, on its behalf, the rebels who have defied legitimate authority. Fighting or resisting the Ethiopian forces is therefore a rejection of the government cloaked in a rejection of occupation. Those who do so act not from religious motives but from clan motives: they want to keep what they gained during the civil war, and religion is no more than a façade with which they hope to deceive the people into fighting on their side.

The Second Camp

This camp sees the country as occupied by Ethiopian forces, and the transitional government as nothing but a tool that works for this occupation and entrenches it, so long as it serves the personal interests of the group dealing with it, regardless of the interest of the people. This camp therefore holds that one must work to drive the occupier out, wasting no time on talk, and confront it with force and resistance until it leaves the country. These, too, are divided into two groups:

• One group has reached this conclusion because of the principle or ideology it embraces, whether its starting point is religious or patriotic. Its position is the firmest of all and cannot change. It summons up the weight of the historical conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia and Ethiopia's designs on Somali lands⁴; it rests on the facts of history, geography and politics; and it cites Ethiopia's destructive role during the civil war.
• The other group has reached this decision because the party it represents, whether a clan, an individual or a region, has lost out, or because its clan's interests have been lost in the present situation. This group could make a 180-degree turn if it found its interest lay with the occupation or the transitional government. It follows interest, not principle.

The Active Players on the Scene

The Somali Government

It has become clear to most Somalis that the Transitional Federal Government did not come to serve the homeland. It is made up of a collection of warlords with nothing in common to bind them. Most of the time it has no say in its own affairs, having been used as a shirt of Uthman⁵ for the occupation of the country; and to this very moment the Ethiopian government uses it as a front to justify its occupation and give it legitimacy.

Its whole edifice is riddled with political, structural, economic and military weakness.

Its political weakness lies in its having no political programme or administrative structure whatsoever. Even the posts that exist are names without substance: there are no headquarters for the ministries and no plan of work for any ministry. It controls no city, not even those it claims to control, such as Mogadishu and Baidoa. Add to this the lack of the political competence needed to lift a country out of the ruin they themselves have inflicted on it for seventeen years.

As for its structural weakness, the relations among its members are neither cohesive nor harmonious. They are, rather, relations of conflicting interests and of rivalry in offering loyalty and services to Ethiopia, each seeking to win more of its favour.

Its military weakness is evident from its reliance on foreigners: it has no army or police worthy of the name, and depends instead on clan militias and occupation forces.

Its economic weakness shows in its lack of the financial resources needed to run the country. This is because most donor countries have held back from giving it financial aid, in view of its weakness and unpopularity and for fear that the money would find its way into personal accounts. And while the Islamic Courts⁶ managed to steer the country in every respect without any financial resources from within or support from without, the question arises: why do these men need financial resources to do less than the Courts did, despite the international support and legal legitimacy their government enjoys?

The reason lies in its unpopularity, in the opposition of most Somalis to it, and in their belief that it is a band of thieves “recruited by foreign powers, in a foreign country, to serve foreign interests”. The Italian Deputy Foreign Minister, Sentinelli⁷, summed up her impression of the government after visiting Mogadishu and meeting its leading figures: “I believe that the transitional government cannot carry out its functions because it lacks local support, and the various political groups in the country do not feel represented in the government.”

The Ethiopian Forces

The Ethiopian occupation forces are the real rulers on the ground. It is they who fight and destroy, negotiate and agree truces, not in the government's name but in their own.

Their colonial face showed itself when they used air strikes and heavy artillery indiscriminately on densely populated districts of Mogadishu, when their soldiers raped women, when they deliberately obstructed the delivery of food and humanitarian supplies despite the urgent need for them, and when they shelled hospitals. The result was the displacement of more than 500,000 of Mogadishu's inhabitants and the deaths of 1,600 civilians. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, this made the situation in Mogadishu more dangerous and worse than in any other conflict zone, since it produced a greater outflow of refugees than any other country, the conflicts in Sudan and Iraq included.

It is clear that this destructive occupying power is deliberately weakening the government and asserting its own control on the ground, making plain that it alone has the first and the last word: it cares nothing whether there is a Somali government or not. The situation it has created in Somalia resembles that of the region it has occupied for years, the Western Somali region⁸, where there are administrations of local people appointed by the occupier that control nothing and rely on the Ethiopian army to repress the people. This political landscape, which the Ethiopian forces have worked to entrench, serves Ethiopia's aims perfectly as it seeks, as a colonial power, to strike direct deals with the clans in the absence of any semblance of authority.

The Resistance and the Islamic Courts

The armed resistance has offered examples of military heroism and of self-sacrifice for the homeland, and has acquitted itself well in standing up to Ethiopian colonialism despite its limited military means and lack of outside support. This was seen in the Three-Day War in March and the One-Week War in April⁹, in which the enemy brought all its military might to bear yet failed to break the national resistance, let alone destroy it. The resistance's decision to change its military tactics so as to reduce civilian casualties was wise and sound: it switched from direct confrontation with heavy weapons to guerrilla warfare, which deals painful and devastating blows to the occupying army every day and has so far denied it any advantage.

Yet this valiant resistance lacks certain things, which may be its weak points. They are:

• First, its merging with the militias of the southern clans, the Hawiye¹⁰, which were fighting under the command of the clan elders, who negotiated on their behalf and made truces in their name. The Islamic Courts go unmentioned in the negotiations. This weakens the Courts' political discourse, makes them look like a clan movement, and leaves many Somalis wary of them. It also strengthens the picture the occupation forces want to present to international opinion: that the Somalis do not reject them, and that those who reject them and fight them are a single clan group. And it strengthens their claim that Somalia is not a state but a collection of nomadic clans with clashing and incompatible interests.
• Second, the existence of a faction counted as part of the resistance that works under the command of neither the resistance nor the Courts, serves a foreign agenda and lies outside the Courts' control. This faction is made up of the group called “al-Shabaab”¹¹, which has extremist leanings, carries out assassinations and suicide operations, and exploits Somalia's circumstances to serve its own agenda. If it is not reined in or disowned, and dealt with wisely, it may grow, its problem may worsen and become intractable, and it may become another thorn for which Somalia could be targeted. It must therefore not be covered up for, but cast out and isolated from the work of resistance, unless it commits itself to the true course of the resistance.
• Third, the political side of the Courts is weak in its organisational structure and administrative hierarchy, and they lack a written political project. This weakens their ability to market their victories on the ground and to negotiate on them politically.

The Clan Elders and Their Militias

Since the entry of the Ethiopian forces, the clan elders in Mogadishu have acquired a political weight they never enjoyed during the civil war, when the warlords held sway and sidelined them, except when they used the clan for their own base political ends.

These elders have used this weight against the colonisers, having discovered that the government the colonisers brought with them was seeking to marginalise their clans' role in government. They stood with the resistance first for that reason, and then out of rejection of the occupation. In the recent war in Mogadishu their name came strikingly to the fore: they negotiated and spoke for the resistance in Mogadishu and conducted the political battle ably.

The position of these elders towards Ethiopian colonialism has so far been good, broadly beyond reproach. This is owed partly to the awareness of some of them, and partly to pressure from most of the educated among their own people, in the diaspora and at home, who keep issuing statements urging them to confront the occupation and not to submit to it; and partly, too, to their own sense that their clan has been wronged. But this position cannot be wholly relied upon, for matters may change if circumstances change.

As for their position on the government, their rejection of it and their opposition to it, this is dictated by the way the government works and deals with them, marginalising their role.

These elders can tip the balance in favour of one side over another, but they cannot stop the resistance, which belongs to no clan and is waging a guerrilla war. The most they can restrain is the militias that answer to them.

The Free Parliamentarians

The free parliamentarians are the members of parliament who refused to work with the government after it brought in the Ethiopian forces illegitimately and without consulting parliament. At their head is the Speaker of Parliament, who was elected before the government was formed and enjoys constitutional legitimacy¹². They number up to forty members, of various clans and leanings, but most of them are marked by political awareness, a degree of education and a sense of loyalty to the homeland.

They have taken an honourable stand against the occupation and against the Federal Government that brought it in, proclaiming its illegitimacy night and day and working to defeat its project through political struggle.

Some among them, however, joined for reasons other than principle, and how firm these will stand is open to question if their ambitions are dangled before them.

The Somalis of the Diaspora

Because of the long civil war, Somalis have a large presence in the diaspora, east and west. Most have built new lives and adapted to the conditions of the countries they live in, but they do not forget their homeland. Some carry political or academic weight in their fields; many are in the workforce; and they have their own organisations and associations, community and civil institutions, which have gained weight where they live. If they organised themselves further, they could influence political decision-makers, especially in democratic countries.

They played a prominent part in standing by the Islamic Courts, and they still play the same part in supporting the resistance financially. They undertake political action through lobby groups, or directly through their own institutions in the countries where they live, but they have not yet reached the point of changing policies.

In this context, long rounds of discussion were held among political activists in the West, country by country, on the best ways of ending the occupation. The activists then met in Stockholm, the capital of Sweden, on 3–4 February 2007: some fifty leaders of organisations, together with activists and intellectuals, from European countries and North America. Afterwards they issued a statement condemning what is happening in Somalia, and that meeting formed a committee charged with coordinating and preparing for a larger conference to be held in Britain.

As a result, a larger conference was held in Leicester on 6–8 April 2007. Nearly 300 people of different leanings and clans attended, representing the elite of the Somali diaspora: thinkers, intellectuals and university teachers, as well as politicians and civil-society activists. Members of the Islamic Courts and of the free parliamentarians also took part.

After intensive and transparent consultations in the corridors of the conference among all the participants from the various Somali political organisations, including the free parliamentarians and the leadership of the Islamic Courts, a consensus was reached to establish a broad-based national front to take on the task of liberating the country. The conference agreed on the means and methods for achieving this and adopted an ambitious plan of action. It also formed a committee drawn from different countries to follow the situation in Somalia and to prepare for a larger conference six months later.

These émigrés and others organise demonstrations in various Western capitals, in an orderly and coordinated way, to reject the occupation and demand the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from Somalia. They try to make their voice heard by officials through democratic channels.

The Positions of International Players

The United States

The United States of America was on hand for the Ethiopian invasion and backed it; indeed, it supported it technically, militarily and logistically. It used its satellites to supply the Ethiopians with information on where the Islamic Courts' fighters were. More than that, it pursued Courts members withdrawing south along the Kenyan border, and used its warplanes to strike at them and wipe them out, though it failed to do so¹³.

It had reckoned, as the Ethiopian government had led it to believe, that once the Courts were driven out by force, the Ethiopians, with the help of the Transitional Federal Government, could take control of the situation, since the Somalis were weary of war and conflict. But that did not happen. Instead, the government and the Ethiopian forces met fierce resistance, the government was paralysed, and Washington saw how incompetent its members were; and its tone began to soften. Anyone following events can see the confused position of the American administration, which says one thing and contradicts it the next day.

This confused position is where American policy now stands. It wanted to win a military victory by proxy in the Horn of Africa, so as to present its people with some victory in its declared war on terror after the defeats it suffered in Iraq and Afghanistan. But defeat and disgrace have overtaken it in Somalia as well.

The European Union

At first the European Union seemed to be following in the footsteps of the United States, but it has begun to break away from Washington's lead, especially after the direct clashes in Somalia between the Ethiopian forces and the Somali resistance. In these the Ethiopian forces could not settle the battle in their favour; indeed, they suffered heavy losses of men and achieved nothing, unless one counts killing civilians, displacing hundreds of thousands and destroying buildings. This exposed their position before the world, and the position of those who backed them.

Positions are now beginning to change. Some European officials meet members of the Courts, sometimes formally and sometimes informally, seeking to placate them and win them over. Most of them are now pressing for an inclusive reconciliation conference along lines other than those the transitional government wants.

The recent battles in Mogadishu played a large part in changing the international position on the occupation, and international and Arab voices have begun to rise, insisting that the Ethiopian occupation must withdraw from Somalia, because it is aggravating and deepening the crisis rather than resolving it.

The League of Arab States

The position of the League of Arab States on the occupation of Somalia is shameful: more shameful even than its position on the Israeli occupation of Palestine and the American occupation of Iraq. Nothing expresses this better than the failure of the last summit, in Riyadh, to take up the Somali question; it made no mention of Somalia at all. And nothing is more telling, or more damning, than the statement by the president of the largest Arab state, one with strategic interests in Somalia, that his country understands the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia¹⁴. It astonished the Somalis and left them in shock.

Then there is the position of another of Somalia's neighbours, separated from it only by the sea: Yemen, which has taken a stance in favour of the occupation because of its special and privileged relationship with the United States of America. Its president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, declared in Addis Ababa that the Ethiopian forces had played a historic role in occupying Somalia, having declared earlier that the entry of Ethiopian forces into Somalia was legitimate. Yemen enjoys close relations with the transitional government, although it has given refuge to some members of the Courts, who are all but held captive there, since they are not permitted to engage in any political activity.

Apart from Qatar, which recently gave refuge to a group from the Courts, is making diplomatic efforts and is holding conferences for Somalis, there is only Saudi Arabia, which has gone no further than declaring its readiness to host talks, and Kuwait, whose emir recently called for the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from Somalia and for respect for the sovereignty of the Somali state.

IGAD¹⁵

IGAD is now at risk of collapse, having been shaken by the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia. It has seen Eritrea break away over its support for Ethiopia: Eritrea suspended its membership in protest at the violation of the principles of sovereignty and of regional peace and security, the very principles the organisation was founded to uphold.

The positions of IGAD's member states can be summed up as two camps: one supporting the occupation, comprising Kenya and Uganda alongside Ethiopia, and one opposing it, comprising Eritrea, Sudan and Djibouti. But the states in each camp do not support or oppose to the same degree, given their economic means, their weight in the region, and their relations and interests with the United States of America.

Kenya's position is unique. It has had military alliances with Ethiopia against Somalia since 1964¹⁶, and it is actually involved in the war against Somalia, through coordination and participation. It has taken part in the pursuit operations and given logistical support, has closed its borders to innocent Somali refugees, treats them as war criminals, and hands them over to Ethiopia.

Uganda is involved in the war effort against Somalia, and not only because it has troops in Somalia that take part in military operations alongside the Ethiopian army, or stand by as spectators while towns and buildings are destroyed over the heads of the innocent. Its agreement to send the African peacekeeping force is nothing new: it has shown its intention to play this role, in collusion with Ethiopia, since early 2002¹⁷.

Then there is Eritrea, which America and the Ethiopian regime accuse of supporting the resistance and the Courts, and every movement confronting the Ethiopian regime, including the liberation fronts within Ethiopia. That is no surprise when we consider the relationship between the two countries and their dispute over the border areas where both have massed their troops.

Eritrea's position in rejecting the occupation is among the firmest. It has embraced the leadership of the Somali resistance movement in Asmara¹⁸ and supports the Somali cause sincerely and without reservation. This has made it a leading player in the Horn of Africa, now that what it predicted about the Ethiopian invasion has been borne out. It is the only party with any influence over the Somali national leadership, and it could contribute decisively to a peace mission. It has begun to reap the fruits: the European Union has expressed appreciation of its position and welcomed it to play an active role in the Somali peace process.

Djibouti has special ties with Somalia. The two are united by ethnicity, race and language, by a common border, and by other shared bonds and geopolitical considerations that unite the strategic interests of the two countries. Djibouti regards the occupation of Somalia as a direct threat to its own survival, and the continued collapse of the Somali state and the persistence of conflict and civil war there as a direct threat to itself if it goes on over the long term. Prompted by these fears, it has played a central part in bringing about a number of reconciliation processes in the past, which would have ended in success but for continual Ethiopian interference to wreck their results.

On the eve of the invasion of Somalia, the Djiboutian president, Ismail Omar Guelleh, addressed an impassioned speech to the Somali nation, urging it to unite in the face of the danger of fragmentation, occupation and the plunder of the national wealth. Djibouti's ability to help, however, is crippled by its geographical size and its political and economic strength. Its alliance with the United States, and the pressure it is under from Washington, also play a negative part, as do its economic interests with Ethiopia and the fragility of its own economic resources.

Sudan, too, is bound to Somalia by cultural and geopolitical ties. It mediated between the Transitional Federal Government and the Islamic Courts, when the latter controlled two-thirds of Somalia, in cooperation with the European Union, the Arab League and IGAD¹⁹. The negotiations very nearly reached a formula of understanding acceptable to all the parties at the table, but the United States and Ethiopia were playing behind the scenes to undermine any agreement and render it null and void.

There is no doubt that Sudan is uneasy about the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia, but it is in no position to take a strong stand, as Eritrea has, or decisive measures, because of the crises that hobble its freedom of movement in the region, such as Darfur, Southern Sudan and Eastern Sudan, and its sensitive relations with Eritrea. There is also the balance of power between Sudan and Ethiopia, given the length of their common border and the latter's ability to retaliate if Sudan took a firm stand.

The African Union

The African Union's position reflects the realities of a world dominated by a power that prefers the big stick in its approach to, and dealings with, Africa. This is how the conflict in Darfur has been handled, and every other African issue. The Union is governed by the strategic interests of each member, all of them bound in one way or another to America's absolute dominance of the world. Yet when the question of sending African troops to Somalia was put to the vote, it took a religious turn and was viewed through that lens.

Two important African countries, South Africa and Egypt, have distinctive positions. South Africa regards the conflict in Somalia as regional, meaning a conflict of regional ambitions that must be treated as such, and sees the United States as part of the problem, not part of the solution. As for Egypt, after declaring that it understood the Ethiopian invasion, it began to sense the long-term strategic danger the occupation poses to its interests in the Horn of Africa, and began to change its tone, despite its fear that the Islamic trend in the Horn might affect it at home. It recently declared that the withdrawal of the occupation army from Somalia is a key factor in solving the Somali problem, and this was followed by a clear position affirming its rejection of the occupation, while also rejecting any Islamic movement or trend taking power in Somalia.

Facts That Cannot Be Skipped Over

There are facts that cannot be skipped over in dealing with the Somali problem, and the present situation in particular. No solution can be discussed without focusing on them. They are:

The Illegitimacy of the Occupation

The Ethiopian occupation is illegitimate under any law, earthly or divine. Those who seek justifications for it are ploughing the sea, nothing more, and their arguments are flimsier than the spider's house²⁰.

Chief among the arguments used is that the Ethiopian forces were invited in by a legitimate, elected Somali government, and are therefore not an occupying force. But looking back, we find that the government was itself the first to tamper with the very legitimacy it claims, since neither the president nor the prime minister has the right to take any sovereign decision without referring it to parliament. It is well known that parliament, after great effort and under heavy pressure during its session in Baidoa, did not approve the bringing in of Ethiopian forces. On the contrary, its resolution stipulated that no forces should be brought in from the neighbouring countries that share Somalia's borders, which include Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti²¹. Moreover, the forces parliament did approve were not invasion forces but forces to train the army, nothing more. With that, the argument of invitation falls.

The second argument is that the Ethiopian government has the right to intervene to defend itself because its strategic security is threatened. This is the argument of one who knows nothing of international law and has only heard of it through the media. International law does not permit any state to invade another and violate its sovereignty merely because that state poses a threat to its security. Otherwise there would be no state that did not harbour such fears of its neighbours, and if this were allowed, the law of the jungle would prevail, in which the strong do as they please. Rather, the other state must cross its borders and violate them, and only then may it defend itself. Hostile statements and verbal threats cannot serve as a pretext for crossing borders; there are steps that a fearful state must follow through the United Nations. And then, who could threaten whose security and interests? Ethiopia, with its seventy million people, its wealth and resources, its international alliances and its vast army? Or Somalia, with its ten million, in the grip of a ruinous civil war, without authority and without an army?

The occupation is therefore illegitimate by every measure, for the occupation by any state of another state that is a member of the United Nations is unacceptable and unlawful and constitutes a violation of international law.

The massacres, or war crimes, recently committed by the occupation forces in Mogadishu prove beyond all doubt that they are an occupying force that cares nothing for the people or for civilians. By the same token, the transitional government loses its legitimacy, which consists in safeguarding the security of citizens and the sovereignty of the state.

The Duty of Resistance

From the standpoint of international legitimacy, any people under occupation has the right to defend itself and to resist the occupier by whatever methods and means are possible, and such resistance cannot be deemed terrorism.

The Incompetence of the Government

This government cannot in any way be relied on, built upon or dealt with. To do so would be a waste of time and effort, given its lack of real legitimacy and its structural, political and economic weakness, and the rest of what we have set out in detail above.

The Reality of the Islamic Courts

The Islamic Courts, which today form the spearhead of the declared resistance to the Ethiopian project and its occupation, enjoy great popularity among Somalis because of what they achieved in the six months during which they ruled two-thirds of Somalia, despite the mistakes they made. This popular trust is something the transitional government lacks, even though it has a written charter to govern it. But the Courts suffer from shortcomings in several respects that make their resistance incomplete, and it is feared that it may not bear fruit in the long run. Among these shortcomings are:

• The absence of a written political project that could be presented to all, near and far, to the public and to governments, so that support or rejection could be given in its light and accountability rest upon it.
• The lack of clarity in their position on many matters, among them the African peacekeeping force: on the one hand they oppose it, and on the other they deal with it. And if they reject this force, what alternative do they have that could embarrass the occupier and press it to leave: Arab forces, Islamic forces or international forces? For it is clear, given international realities, that no one will agree to leave the field to chaos if the Ethiopian forces are asked to withdraw immediately. The same goes for their position on the Somali territories that Ethiopia and Kenya have long occupied²². Will they keep silent about them, or do they want to recover them by force? Or will they leave them to their inhabitants to decide their own fate?
• Their lack of a unified political vision. The positions you hear from Courts officials on many issues vary with the mood of the speaker. While some declare that they are not seeking to return to power, you hear from others that they seek to topple the government, drive out the occupation and return to ruling Somalia. And while you hear from some that they do not seek to apply the Sharia literally, you find that practices carried out in their name during their rule were closer to childish literalism than to reason, and these were never disowned or condemned, nor were those responsible held to account.
• The absence of a modern political organisational structure, in which hierarchy and administrative structure are the foundation and everyone knows his place, role and task in the organisation. Spontaneity and improvisation are what govern and dominate the Courts. All this is because most members of their Shura and Executive councils lack political and administrative maturity, are far from understanding the complexities of the international and regional situation surrounding the Somali question, and are unskilled in political manoeuvre.
• The Courts' alliance with the Hawiye clan, as emerged recently in the fighting inside Mogadishu, also counts against their patriotism. Likewise, the fact that most members of the Courts, especially their best-known names, come from this clan casts doubts on them that must be taken seriously. Even if they are honest and sincere and following a sound course, what must be borne in mind is the social make-up of Somalia; and the matter is judged not by intentions but by practice. This could be understood at their beginnings, given the circumstances, the context and the setting. But now that they have gone abroad and shouldered the cares of the homeland, it must be clearly reconsidered, and officials must be drawn in due proportion, so that the Courts are not accused of being exclusive or of representing the interests of a particular clan.

The Forthcoming Reconciliation Conference

There has been much talk lately of a reconciliation conference that the government intends to hold and that has been repeatedly postponed²³. The international community is pressing for it to be held, with all parties taking part. What could it achieve if it were held?

Observers regard the conference the government is promoting as a snare for making financial support rain down from the international community, and then to legitimise its own position. People cannot believe in a conference producing a political settlement for Somalia when its strings are held by the transitional government and Ethiopia and it is convened under their auspices.

What most clearly betrays the ill and premeditated intentions is the insistence of the two sponsors of the reconciliation process on recognising no political representation of a national character, and on dealing only with the clans and their elders. Because of their political ignorance, these can be manipulated and made to accept the formation of clan cantons that would function as enclaves annexed to the Ethiopian empire.

And because the occupation is utterly rejected, there is no hope at all of any reconciliation taking place under its shadow, whatever the cost. Nor, under the prevailing conditions, can an objective observer expect a reconciliation conference to be held at present.

Forging the Solution

Before setting out the solution this paper proposes, it is worth looking at some of the solutions circulating in discussions among Somalis at home and in the diaspora, and then presenting the solution the paper adopts.

Proposed Solutions

Relying on Armed Resistance Alone

Continuing the armed resistance and treating it as the only means of liberating the country, regardless of its consequences. This thinking is held by certain extremist forces that are adept at wielding the sword but not at knowing when and where to draw it, against whom to draw it today and against whom tomorrow. That is to say, they are ignorant of politics and diplomacy and their corridors, and lack a vision for setting priorities that would determine when to use arms and when to use politics.

Such a solution may complicate the crisis rather than solve it. Indeed, it would make it easy for the client government and the occupation to use the term “terrorism”, and to market it successfully, in an international climate hostile to all liberation and resistance movements.

Relying on Political Resistance Alone

Some put forward the solution of political resistance without resort to “violence”, along the lines of the Shiite blocs in Iraq²⁴: the idea that political work with the government is more effective, and more likely to achieve the goal of expelling the occupier, than military action. This thinking is held by a group who claim to care for the homeland but who are linked to the government or the occupation, directly or indirectly, or who are driven by personal or clan interests.

Those who offer this solution plead the might of the occupier's military hardware and its destructive capacity. They try to cover up the illegitimacy of the occupation by acknowledging the mistakes of the Federal Government, but then they turn round and say that it was the Courts that challenged Ethiopia and, at the very least, hastened the coming of the occupation. They talk of the Courts' mistakes, which belong to the past, and conveniently forget to speak of the atrocities the occupation is committing with the government's backing. They fail to distinguish between the mistakes the Courts made in an honest effort to arrive at what is right and the government's deliberate mistakes, committed with malice aforethought.

Forming a Government in Exile

Some put forward the idea of a government in exile made up of the leading men of the Courts, the free parliamentarians, Somali intellectuals and patriotic politicians, which would seek to embody the national and liberationist aspirations of Somalis at home and in exile.

This solution, for all its merits and the sincerity of those proposing it, lacks a realistic vision. For a government in exile to succeed, views on the occupation and its illegitimacy must first be united. Moreover, there would be no one representing legitimacy (even in theory) at the legal level, as the present federal government does. It would also require guarantees from influential powers and states that they would adopt the government in exile, recognise it and deal with it on that basis, and no such thing exists or is in prospect.

Forming a Technocratic Government

Some put forward the idea of a technocratic government that would represent neither of the two opposing camps in Somali politics, but would be made up of national figures of good repute at home and abroad. Its task, after the occupation leaves, would be to conduct the procedural business of government on the basis of the interim constitution. It would build the administrative organs of government and then prepare for free and fair elections in which all would take part, on the basis of parties with declared political programmes.

This solution seems one of the most sensible now on offer, but in practice there are many obstacles to achieving it. First, there is no international will in this direction. Then there is the occupation, which will not leave without international and domestic pressure, and such pressure is not expected to build in the near future. In addition, the present government is fighting desperately to stay in power, even if it must stand on the ruins of the people, knowing that no honest political process would return it to office in any form.

All the solutions above carry part of the answer, but none is complete. This paper claims to seek an integrated solution, one that takes in all the merits of these solutions, but within an integrated framework.

No armed resistance can succeed without a clear political vision and a project understood by those for whom it is fighting, so that they become its mainstay and the vision cannot be clouded for them. Armed resistance must therefore always be guided and judicious. It must not be an end in itself: it must be plain and clear to all that it is a means of achieving the task of liberation, and that if a means closer to achieving the goal is found, that means should be adopted. At home it needs political cover from all the clans, not from one clan alone, and from civil society; abroad it needs states that will give it political and military support.

Nor will any diplomacy or politics succeed without the backing of a military force capable of striking: a force that can hurt and inflict pain, and compel acceptance of the diplomatic solution it seeks. The diplomatic and political side speaks for the armed resistance and negotiates in its name, and the hands that bear arms take their orders from it. It is therefore essential to seek integration in this respect, at home and abroad.

The Integrated Solution: A Project of Liberation

It is clear that the transitional government does not have the confidence of Somali society. It made a bad situation worse by enlisting the Ethiopian forces, which robbed it of what credibility it had, already at its lowest ebb even before that. It lacks the political and diplomatic competence to run the affairs of government, as we have pointed out above.

There is no equivalent force or political entity that seriously rivals it, except the Islamic Courts and some of the parliamentarians who broke away from the government. But these have so far been unable to frame a strategic project that expresses the concerns of Somalia as a whole rather than those of one section of society, and as things stand they cannot play the role required of them.

Because of the course of its development and the circumstances of time and place, the Courts movement is identified with the Hawiye clans, despite its general national and Islamic discourse. Add to this its immature political experience, as witnessed in the period when they scaled the heights of power, and the predominance within it of political Islam, which some who are wary of it may find hard to swallow.

There are, moreover, demands in political work that the Islamic Courts may not be able to meet decisively without endangering their unity. They draw their momentum and popularity from their rejection of the occupation and their refusal to make concessions or bargain, which may sometimes be necessary as a political tactic to reach the goal. They certainly cannot persuade their Islamist followers of this, least of all the hard-line cadres among them, and above all in the absence of a sure and tangible return.

As for the parliamentarians who called themselves “the Free”, they are not of one clay, nor do they start from one ideology; nothing unites them but their rejection of the Ethiopian occupation. It is therefore hard for them to form a pressure group or a force with a unified project except by leaning on other forces.

Hence it is clear that the two sides (the Courts and the parliamentarians) are unable to form that force, the hoped-for bloc that could compete with the government at the international level and not merely at home. That is the duty that patriots and Islamists must strive to fulfil and accomplish at the earliest opportunity.

In pursuit of such a force, the government's equal in strength and its superior in political vision and popular support, this paper proposes the creation of a movement that carries a strategic political project seeking liberation and the building of the state, and that is able to engage in political manoeuvre. The Courts would feed into it as one of its components and work in coordination with it without its having to bear their liabilities; and parliamentarians, intellectuals and political activists at every level would likewise be part of it.

The solution proposed in this paper may seem tangled and long-term rather than an immediate remedy. That is because the problem is more complex than it appears on the surface: its threads and lines are entangled, it is more than a decade and a half old, and the occupation is only one link in its chain, one chapter of its story.

We would point out that the solution proposed here lays down broad lines for a process that may take years and will need the efforts of every Somali. It must take into account all the resources available to the Somali people at home and abroad: resources that would have achieved a great deal, had there been a plan to invest them, and had they been channelled in one direction and devoted to a single goal. That will not come about through wishful thinking, but through well-studied plans for putting them to use, under a wise leadership and a sound administration that enjoys the confidence of all, shares their concerns and involves them in devising the means of reaching the common goal.

Naturally, this paper does not go into the fine details of the solution/project, but presents its general lines, so as to open the way for fresh thinking on the particulars that serve this integrated solution. Unless there is a comprehensive solution of this kind, there will be no solution that uproots the problem, and we shall go on turning in a vicious circle.

The Shape of the Proposed Movement

• It should be a national liberation movement, not a clan one.
• It should have a modern administrative structure, linked hierarchically both horizontally and vertically, and centrally organised.
• It should possess all the necessary talents in military, political and organisational leadership, and all the capabilities a general liberation movement needs.
• It should work to lay down the infrastructure of the future administration and institutions, and to run the systems and structures needed for government, so that it is ready to govern at the first opportunity that presents itself. The models we advise studying, and drawing on what is useful in their experience, include²⁵:
• the Palestine Liberation Organisation;
• the Algerian National Liberation Front;
• and the Jewish Agency.

These movements were organised in the form of a state. Many movements and currents sharing a single aim came together under them, united in an integrated organisational framework within a project that embraced everyone. They operated as a state abroad, and when the opportunity arose they organised themselves to become a state at home.

• It should be an inclusive movement, not a political party, so that every party with a national sense, Islamist or secular, can find itself in its project. It should include even those elements that now operate within the logic of the clan but possess a national sense and loyalty to the homeland. There are no doubt many such people, as the free parliamentarians' breakaway from the government on patriotic grounds bears out, though they reached their posts through their clans.
• It should work through its members to set up trade and professional unions, sports teams and federations in the diaspora, such as a union of Somali journalists in the diaspora and a union of Somali writers in the diaspora, all coming under the umbrella of this movement.

(The hawala companies²⁶ spread abroad could form a union or an international banking organisation that abides by international laws and conventions and seeks to bring its financial dealings into line with international banking standards, later to become the nucleus of a Somali national central bank.)

Characteristics of the Strategic Project

This movement must frame a vision of Somalia's future, from the way out of the tunnel and the reconciliation conference to the form of government it wants for Somalia. The movement's strategic project should therefore have the following characteristics:

• National in ambition: by this we mean that the limits of what the movement seeks should be clear and defined; that it should keep itself from being used by any regional or international power; and that it should carry no all-embracing agenda whose stage is the universe and whose span is eternity. The project should respond to and address every section of Somali society, not one section or one party or certain parties. There should therefore be representation of every clan in all its administrations, not to entrench clannism but to entrench patriotism.
• Islamic in vision: by this we mean that the movement's vision and strategy should accord and harmonise with the culture and religion of the Somali people, neither contradicting them nor straying beyond their bounds. At the same time, it must not be drawn into sweeping, ill-considered religious slogans that may backfire. We live in a world of many religions, and we should not make enemies of all the followers of other faiths, since relations between peoples rest on interests, not on religion.
• Realistic in its demands: meaning that its demands should be legitimate and comprehensible, grounded in international laws and conventions and not overstepping them, so that it gains international credibility, does not embarrass before the international community those who wish to support it, and can win support from the Arab and Muslim worlds. Its positions would then be public and understood by all the players in the Somali game.

Marketing the Project

This project must be marketed at home and abroad. To make that easier:

• Diaspora organisations of every shade should be involved in drafting the project, so that they feel ownership of it. These organisations have a legal presence and political capabilities in the democracies where they live, which enable them to press the countries they live in to support this project.
• The movement should undertake political action to persuade the League of Arab States and its member states, visiting each in turn, to adopt this project and market it internationally, so that Somalia may be rescued from its present plight.
• A political bloc of Somali intellectuals and politicians should be formed to work to strengthen and support this project in international forums, academic institutions and research centres, and to write about it in internationally respected journals.
• There must be organised work among Somali émigrés at the international level to exert influence in the European and American arenas.
• Efforts must be made to open offices in every country, beginning with the Arab states and then the populous and internationally prominent Muslim states, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan; and also in South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya and other countries with their own strategy and weight.
• It should avoid standing against the interests of any state, or adopting one side's point of view in disputes between states.

Encircling the Occupation and Its Agents Politically and in the Media by Building a Wide Network of Relations

Media and political pressure are vital in confronting the occupation and its agents. Therefore:

• The movement must have its own independent media to speak for it, so that there is no confusion. Thought could be given to setting up its own news agency or media centre to serve as the movement's mouthpiece and explain its positions on events.
• It should press for those responsible for the recent massacres in Somalia to be held to account, and use this as leverage, a hand at the throat of the Ethiopian forces and their government, and of the Somali government as well.
• Dialogue must be opened with the opposition in Ethiopia, in consultation or coordination with the liberation movements of the Ogaden, the Oromo and the Afar²⁷, with a view to joint cooperation, at both the global and the local level, to put pressure on the Ethiopian government.
• Thought should also be given to the possibility of opening dialogue with the administrations of Somaliland and Puntland²⁸. Although both have relations with the Ethiopian government, they no doubt have certain fears of Ethiopia and of the transitional government. Opening dialogue with them, through intermediaries if it cannot be done directly, in an effort to draw them into the national ranks, is of the utmost importance, so as to calm their fears and reassure them about the movement, and so that they find in it a refuge and a source of strength should both of them, or either, be threatened by Ethiopia.

Considering Sources of Income

• Great success can be achieved in finding sources of income for the movement if its financial dealings are marked by transparency, integrity and clarity in the use of funds, with no secret accounts and no unexplained expenditure.
• The movement must not depend on a single source of income, lest it become a plaything in foreign hands. Its first reliance must be on Somali sources.
• To this end, émigrés should be won over to the greatest possible extent, so that their large remittances can be put to organised use.
• Non-Somali sources, whether states or institutions, should be reserve sources, with the focus on popular rather than official sources. This requires building wide relations with the Arab and Muslim peoples, and with the non-Muslim peoples, who sympathise with the Somali cause; and efforts should be made to turn this sympathy into tangible material support.

English translation prepared by artificial intelligence and reviewed against the Arabic for accuracy of meaning and rhetoric.